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Law, Culture, and the Humanities (forthcoming 2016)
JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY:
Activist Judging in the Light of Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic
Experimentalism
William H. Simon
This essay examines the charge that activist judging is inconsistent with
democracy in the light of two recent perspectives in legal scholarship. The
perspectives – Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic Experimentalism –
suggest in convergent and complementary ways that the charge ignores or
oversimplifies relevant features of both judging and democracy. In particular,
the charge exaggerates the pre-emptive effect of activist judging, and it
implausibly conflates democracy with electoral processes. In addition, it
understands consensus as a basis for judicial legitimacy solely in terms of preexisting agreement and ignores the contingent legitimacy that can arise from
the potential for subsequent agreement.
I. Introduction
A familiar theme in American legal discourse pits judicial judgments about
justice against democracy.

Judges, some argue, should not rely on their

understanding of justice when that understanding is in tension with legislative
enactments. A still stronger version challenges the idea that such understanding
should even guide or supplement interpretation of legislative enactments or
common law authority.
The problem with values of justice according to this critique is that people
disagree about them. They agree that certain values, like equality and freedom of
speech, are important but only at a high level of abstraction. These general concepts
do not generate uncontroversial answers to particular issues.

Many powerful

theories strive to link the general concepts to resolutions of particular cases.
However, people disagree both about which of these theories is better, and they
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often disagree within a given theory about which answer to a concrete dispute the
theory supports. For the critics, there is no way to legitimate judicial judgments
about justice in the absence of something close to consensus.
According to the critique, it is dogmatism or arrogance for judges or the
relatively educated and affluent class from which they emerge to suggest that they
have privileged insight into what is good or right. They have no way to validate
their premises against the modernist skepticism they themselves deploy against
beliefs they do not hold. Imposing such judgments violates the fundamental moral
duty of contemporary political thought of respect for people with whom one
disagrees. Moreover, it seems incompatible with political accountability. Given
judges’ relative immunity from political pressure, errors in their decisions cannot be
readily exposed and redressed.
Democracy is one fundamental value to which the critique would have judges
commit themselves. They view it as procedural rather than substantive. They seem
to believe that democratic values are more widely shared than the substantive
values they regard as problematical. But they also make arguments of principle that
suggest that democracy is one commitment that does not depend on consensus.
They value democracy because it treats people respectfully as equals.

One-

person/one-vote democracy with universal suffrage and majority decision respects
equality strongly in principle and at least minimally adequately in practice.
We can take Antonin Scalia, John Ely, and Jeremy Waldron as familiar
examples of this critique.1 The reach of their positions varies. Ely and Waldron are
largely concerned with judicial review, and Ely concedes a broader role than
Waldron for courts in reviewing legislation that impairs the democratic process.
Scalia conceives a broader role than Waldron for courts in reviewing legislation that
impinges on textually grounded constitutional norms, but unlike Ely’s and
Waldron’s, his critique of judicial resort to informal values of justice extends to
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1997; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press, 1980; Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, Yale
L.aw Journal, 115 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2000.
1
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ordinary interpretation of legislation as well as judicial review. Nevertheless, there
is a basic common ground among the three: the idea that legitimacy must come
either from consensus or democracy and the consequent belief that judicial
judgments in hard cases grounded in ideals of justice are unlikely to be legitimate.
The critique is important because it captures widespread anxieties, first, about the
public grounding of moral judgments, and second about the exercise of power by
judges. Yet, although people often invoke its arguments against judicial decisions
they reject, few embrace them consistently.
We can get insight into the limitations of the critique by contrasting its
treatment of judicial activism with two other perspectives in recent legal
scholarship -- Democratic Constitutionalism (DC) and Democratic Experimentalism
(DE). The former is exemplified by the work of Bruce Ackerman, Reva Siegel, and
various collaborators;2 the latter is exemplified by the work of Charles Sabel and
various collaborators.3 These two perspectives share with the critique doubts that
judicial authority can be secured by abstract normative theorizing or doctrinal
heuristics.

They also share a desire to square judicial independence with

democracy. But DC and DE, in common or complementary ways, suggest that the
critique oversimplifies its account of activist judging and present an argument for it
that responds to at least some of the critics’ concerns.
In particular, DC and DE challenge the critique along three dimensions.
First, they suggest that the critique exaggerates and mischaracterizes the
pre-emptive power of courts. Judges do exercise power in important ways, but the

2

E.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Civil Rights Revolution, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,
2014; Reva Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The
Case of the De Facto ERA”, California Law Review, 94 (2006). The term “popular constitutionalism”
might also be applied to this perspective, but that term is often associated with a different view that
contemplates a much more limited role for courts than DC. See Robert Post and Reva Siegel, “Roe
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 42
(2007), p. 373 (distinguishing the “popular constitutionalism” of Larry Kramer and others from DC).
3
E.g., Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”,
Columbia Law Review, 98 (1998); Joshua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy,
European Law Journal, 3 (1997); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes:
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110
Michigan Law Review, 110 (2012).
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exercise is more provisional and contingent and more subject to accountability
mechanisms than the critics allow.
Second, the conception of democracy that the critics oppose to activist
judging is too narrow. It focuses exclusively on electoral and legislative processes
and ignores civil society, in particular, social movement and stakeholder
engagement.

These latter processes respond to a somewhat different, but

nevertheless compelling, conception of democratic equality from the one invoked by
the critics. Activist judging can potentially both induce and be disciplined by such
processes.
Third, the critics’ idea of consensus is too limited.

They assume that

legitimation requires a pre-existing consensus. Yet, judicial intervention can induce
debate and deliberation that leads to consensus. Such induced consensus can
legitimate retrospectively, and the prospect of it can provide a kind of provisional
legitimacy.
II. Democratic Constitutionalism
Brown v. Board of Education is a problem for the critics. The correctness of
Brown is the bedrock of American rights discourse. There is disagreement about its
implications in many situations, but no one can expect to be taken seriously in
rejecting the case’s holding that racially segregated public facilities violate
constitutional equal protection. If there is anything about public law that Americans
agree on, it includes this.

Justice Rehnquist and other conservatives of his

generation had to distance themselves strenuously from their early criticism of the
ruling.4 Herbert Wechsler’s negative assessment, which was once considered the
height of sophistication, is virtually unintelligible today.5
Moreover, the antidiscrimination understanding that has been accepted as
foundational in American public law extends beyond the Brown holding. It
condemns racially-based exclusion from, in addition to education, other public

4

Adam Liptak, New Look at an Old Memo Casts More Doubt on Rehnquist, New York Times
(March 19, 2012).
5
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harvard L. Rev. 1,
(1959).
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services, the electoral process, public and private employment, “public”
accommodations even when privately owned, and state-sanctioned marriage and
family relations. This non-discrimination principle extends to disadvantages based
on ethnicity and religion as well. To be sure, controversy remains about some
applications. There is intense debate about the legality of affirmative action and of
activity with “disparate impact” (decisions based on neutral criteria that have
foreseeably disproportionate effects on protected groups.) But there is a large core
that rests on consensus.
The Brown core is the most important, but it is not the only example of
judicially-declared doctrine of substantive justice that has gained virtual consensus
status. Consider, for example, the “de facto Equal Rights Amendment”. The Equal
Rights Amendment was never enacted as an Article V amendment, but something
very close to the norms its proponents thought the amendment would mandate
have become law through other means, including judicial decision. There has been
little public dissent from a core set of gender-equity norms since Robert Bork was
denied confirmation of his Supreme Court nomination after criticizing the Supreme
Court cases interpreting the 14th amendment equal protection guarantees to apply
to gender discrimination. The core of the de facto ERA is presumptively equal
access for women to education and employment, as expressed in strict scrutiny of
gender classifications. Not included in the core are claims to supportive services
such as childcare or abortion rights.
It is possible that we are witnessing the formation of another consensus of
principle around state neutrality toward sexual identity. Fighting continues around
gay marriage, but the age break-down in reported views suggests that it will not be
long before consensus arrives.
The troubling feature of these examples, and especially the Brown core, for
the critique is that they are matters of substantive justice. If the most agreed-upon
principle in American public law – the Brown core -- is substantive, that presents at
the very least a big counter-example to the critics’ picture of disagreement about
justice as a starting point for constitutional theory.

5

The critics have recognized this problem and responded by trying to
characterize Brown in other ways. Most notably, Ely sought to explain Brown as a
response to a procedural defect in majoritarian democracy – the role of prejudice in
subverting legislators from fair consideration of the interests of minorities. But the
argument was widely considered unsuccessful, and few advance it today. The basic
problem is that it is hard to distinguish in procedural terms the kind prejudice to
which Brown responded from myriad other kinds that do not raise constitutional
problems (for example, prejudice against burglars) without resort to substantive
values.6 In another effort to ground Brown without resort to substantive values,
Michael McConnell tried to show that Brown could be understood in originalist
terms of the sort defended by Justice Scalia, but again, the effort has not proved
broadly persuasive.7 Of course, Ely and McConnell were not doing this work to
support Brown. Brown needed no support. They were working to shore up their
non-substantive approaches by showing that they were compatible with Brown.
Brown, as well as the gender-equity core, are best understood as substantive,
and they rest on a powerful base of social agreement. But of course, this agreement
did not legitimate judicial action in the manner contemplated by the critics. It did
not pre-exist the judicial decisions. Indeed, there was massive and sometimes
violent contestation around them.

The consensus emerged from this conflict.

Consensus did not produce the judicial decisions; it was in substantial part
produced by them.
Democratic Constitutionalism has analyzed the process by which
constitutional principle becomes entrenched in this manner. The key processes are
different from those portrayed by the critics. The critics contrast a pre-emptive
mandate imposed by a court with one enacted by a democratically constituted

“Processual prejudice is a pervasive problem in the American political system…. Carolene
cannot justify its concern with discrete and insular minorities without calling on judges to engage in
a very different kind of judgment, one dealing with the substance of racial and religious prejudice. “
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 939-40 (1985); see also Paul Brest,
The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 131 (1981).
7
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Virginia L. Rev. 947
(1995): Michael J. Klarman, Originalism and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell,
81 Virginia L. Rev. 1937 (1995).
6
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legislature. In the DC account, basic constitutional norms emerge from interaction
among all three branches and between government and the People, acting both as
electorate and civil society.
Judicial decisions state the law in a partial fashion. They typically permit or
require substantive elaboration and enforcement processes that the executive and
legislative branches are best equipped to provide. These other branches have ample
opportunity to advance or resist the courts’ projects. If the process is salient and
sufficiently prolonged, it will become a subject of electoral debate and contention.
Legislative and executive activity will feed back on the agenda of the courts. All
three branches will respond to experiences of enforcement. Election returns will
influence legislatures directly and courts indirectly.

At the same time, social

movement activism will influence the electoral process and informal public
deliberative processes.
The court’s role in this picture is not as strongly pre-emptive as the critics
tend to portray it. In the long run, a court cannot prevail over persistent widespread
opposition. The court will be compelled to back up, even to reverse itself, or its
pronouncements will become dead letter.

Conversely, entrenchment requires

support from all three branches and validation in elections.
Southern racists talked as if the Supreme Court had dictated abandonment of
apartheid.

But properly understood, at most, it merely shifted the burden of

democratic contestation.

They could have prevailed by capturing the three

branches of government in a series of elections, as the New Dealers had done to
reverse the laissez-faire Constitution of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In
order to do that, they would have to engage their fellow citizens over the issues.
Moreover, the range of issues as to which the burden was shifted was ambiguous.
What Brown meant beyond condemnation of de jure segregation and even the scope
of the idea of de jure segregation was left open. Supporters who wanted to establish
an expansive understanding of constitutional equality had ample reason to mobilize
on their own initiative.
Bruce Ackerman’s account emphasizes inter-branch engagement and the role
of the electorate. The Brown core developed in judicial decisions over two decades.
7

They were complemented by high-profile executive initiatives, including executive
orders and agency rule-making, as well as threats and sanctions against recalcitrant
state officials and physical protection of demonstrators against lawless violence.
Congress intervened with a series of statutes, including two “super statutes”: the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The statutes created new
opportunities for private enforcement and empowered the executive branch to
enforce them in new ways. The core was a focus of debate in the Presidential
election of 1964, and Johnson’s landslide victory was a major step in the
entrenchment of the core. Consolidation was advanced following the election of
1968, when Nixon made clear that, notwithstanding his hostility to much of the
liberal agenda of his predecessor, he accepted the Brown core. The two superstatutes were revised in the 1970s in ways designed, for the most part, to
strengthen them.
As Ackerman’s account emphasizes the interaction of official initiative and
the electoral process, Reva Siegel’s account of the de facto ERA emphasizes the role
of engagement in civil society. The ERA inspired a movement for gender-equity and
a counter-movement that sought to limit its ambitions. The amendment failed, in
part because of its ambiguity about key issues on which there was strong division,
such as childcare entitlement and abortion rights. But a core of norms prescribing
equal access to employment and education took root. The Supreme Court played a
role by developing a jurisprudence that treated gender as a suspect classification (a
holding unwarranted by either originalist or proceduralist premises). Again, there
were complementary statutes and executive initiatives. Siegel shows the contours
of the core emerging in the discourse of social movement and counter-movement.
ERA proponents moderated their positions when confronted by protests that their
views devalued traditional family norms and implied a cumbersome expansion of
the welfare state. Their concessions facilitated the emergence of the core.
The disciplinary pressures of social movements reach the courts. Some of
this pressure is communicated through legislatures. When courts act pre-emptively
to hold statutes invalid, they are frequently acting against outlier jurisdictions and
can appeal to strong state legislative trends. Social movement pressure can also act
8

more directly. Siegel has shown that the shape of the courts doctrine on both the de
facto ERA and the still controversial Second Amendment owe much more to social
movement discourse than to formal legal authority.8
Siegel sees deliberation as an imporant mechanism of consensus formation.
In her account the key feature of deliberation is the pressure to understand and
respond to views opposed to one’s own. “The quest to win public confidence and to
capture sites of norm articulation disciplines change agents, leading them to
internalize elements of counterarguments and to other implicit forms of
convergence and compromise.”9
Thus, DC suggests that courts often do well to configure doctrine over hotly
contested issues in ways that promote deliberative engagement. While Siegel is
ambivalent about recent authority on abortion and affirmative action, she argues
that the use of conditional standards in cases like Planned Parenthood v. Casey,10 and
Ricci v. DeStefano11 has desirable effects in inducing continuing discussion of the
issues.12 In Casey, the Court backed off of some of the categorical strictures of Roe v.
Wade in favor a general standard: the prohibition of “undue burden” on the choice
to have an abortion. In its affirmative action cases, the court has refused to either
categorically permit or categorically prohibit racially conscious decision-making
designed to promote inclusion. Rather than condemning abortion regulation and
affirmative action outright, they specify the legitimate purposes of such measures
and then require that the measures be narrowly tailored to such purposes. The
effect is to encourage both debate and experiment over the elaboration of the
standards. Such contestation seems desirable in two ways. First, it holds out the
possible that some form of consensus may emerge. Second, even where they do not
prevail, it gives participants a sense of connection to the processes of decision.

8

Siegel, “De Facto ERA”; Reva Siegel, “Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller,” Harvard Law Review, 122 (2009).
9
Siegel, “De Facto ERA”, p, 1406.
10
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11
129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009).
12
Post and Siegel, “Roe Rage”; Reva Siegel, “From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases”, Yale Law Journal, 120 (2011).
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The Democratic Constitutionalist picture blurs the distinction between
strong and “weak form” judicial review that has become salient recently. In weak
form review, as exemplified in Canada or the United Kingdom, the Court can declare
a statute unconstitutional, but the legislature can nullify the holding by enacting a
new statute explicitly overriding it. In practice, however, legislatures in these
systems seem reluctant to do this.13 In the nominally pre-emptive American system,
a judicial decision can have some effect over persistent, widespread popular
opposition for some period of time. Roe is the prominent modern example. But this
effect is limited in scope and (most likely) in time.
From the point of view of democratic legitimacy, activist judging can be
considered in three categories.
First, some of the courts’ decisions purport to reinforce the democratic
character of the political process.
“representation-reinforcing” review.

Ely’s proceduralist theory allowed for
His vision of democracy was focused on

elections. So the interventions he defended most vigorously were First Amendment
protections of political speech and application of equal protection norms to the
voting process.
Democratic Constitutionalism has a broader vision of the political process
that implies a broader conception of procedural preconditions.

It values free

speech, not just as essential to electoral accountability, but also as safeguarding the
process of popular consensus formation.

Consensus formation requires

opportunities for organized deliberative engagement outside as well as inside
government.

It also requires opportunity to protest against prevailing views.

Consensus is a basis for legitimacy only when it is voluntary and reflective.
Legitimacy is enhanced when positions are subjected to the “full blast” of competing
views.
At the same time, DC values organizational efforts that induce and facilitate
extra-electoral deliberative engagement. Thus, it should accord prominent place in
the canon to the decisions that protected social movement initiative. The Supreme
13

Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in
Comparative Perspective, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
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Court struck down bar regulations that prevented movement organizations from
supporting

or

coordinating

lawsuits

brought

by

individuals,

invalidated

maintenance and champerty rules that banned solicitation of potential litigants;
protected the privacy of organizational member and contributor lists; and carved
out a space for public demonstrations and concerted economic pressure against
trespass, disorderly conduct, and economic conspiracy rules. 14
Ely’s argument was that the critique of judicial activism should not apply to
“representation-reinforcing” decisions because the critique presupposes a
democratic legislature. A judicial decision that imposes a condition of democracy on
the political process cannot be criticized as undemocratic. Or at least, such a
decision is democratic in effect if not in origin. The argument is appealing, but one
can see why critics like Scalia and Waldron are wary of it. Most claims about
substantive justice could be packed into conceptions of democracy, and the
concession could thus end up swallowing the critique. This is not a problem for DC,
however, because it defends activist judging inspired by substantive values.
The second of the DC categories of activist intervention involves the
enforcement of a dominant trend against outliers. Cases like Gideon v. Wainwright15,
requiring appointed counsel for criminal defendants, and Griswold v. Connecticut16,
striking down contraceptive prohibition, followed growing and widespread support
for their principles in federal and state statutes and judicial decisions. The Court’s
constitutional holdings thus rested on incomplete but emerging consensuses. Such
decisions follow broad national deliberation in circumstances where there is ample
evidence of broad national support for them.
The third and most challenging category of activism involves cases like
Brown where the court takes an initiative on the basis of a substantive value without
the support of a dominant trend or emerging consensus. DC defends such cases in
part as deliberation-inducing. These cases do not categorically preempt democracy

14

E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963): NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); In re Primus, 436 US. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 US. 886 (1982).
15
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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in the manner the critique implies. They do involve the exercise of power, but this
power takes the form of three kinds of more modest and contingent effects. First,
the court may have prestige due to features of the judicial role – political
independence, disinterestedness, reason-giving – and this prestige may give
persuasive force to its views. Second, the court exercises agenda control. It creates
a focus of public deliberation and forces officials to address issues they would have
preferred to ignore or defer.

Brown forced political leaders like Presidents

Eisenhower and Kennedy, who were sympathetic to racial equality but who might
otherwise have been inclined to ignore or downplay the issue, to address it saliently
and concretely. Third, the court can shift the burden of initiative. Opponents can no
longer remain passive and enjoy the status quo; they must affirmatively mobilize to
secure what they want. It is generally harder to enact a new rule than to block
change of an old one in any system, and more than usually so in the American. Thus,
the shifting of the burden can be highly significant.
It is not clear how much this revised picture of judicial activism would
placate the critics even if they accepted its descriptive accuracy. The critique
objects most strongly to categorically pre-emptive judicial decisions. It sometimes
suggests that, as long as judicial decisions can be reversed by new legislation, the
value of democracy is satisfied. On this view, there is room for quite a bit of
activism. But the critics would be right to point out that the powers that the court
exercises in even “weak form” review are substantial, and they are not democratic in
the distinctive sense emphasized by the critics of affording equal opportunities for
participation for all citizens. On the other hand, it would be difficult to deprive the
judiciary of some measure of these powers, and doing so would not necessarily
contribute to a more democratic system. Public officials have the potential to
acquire influence through prestige of office in any system. It is doubtful whether
there is any viable system of agenda-setting that respects the critics’ equality
principle. And the power to shift the status quo is in tension with democracy only if
the status quo has some democratic warrant. Often it will not. The status quo may
be the product of some long-ago legislation that persists more through inertia than
popular support. Or it may simply be a matter of informal social custom and power
12

relations reinforced by background laws that regulate property and general social
action.
III. Democratic Experimentalism
Constitutional theory tends to pause when key principles and paradigm cases
have been accepted and political mobilization has waned. But much work remains
to be done. At this point, both the nature of the task and the processes of addressing
it have changed. We are no longer concerned with entrenchment so much as
elaboration.

Disputes are less likely to involve general principles than their

application to varied and incompletely understood circumstances. The institutional
configuration of citizen engagement may also have changed. As the intensity of
informal social movement recedes, it leaves behind newly strengthened
organizations that can continue to engage in a more focused and structured manner.
Democratic Experimentalism has been especially interested in activities at
this stage. Like DC, DE appeals to deliberative engagement and potential consensus
as a path to legitimation. But it focuses on institutional processes that are more
formal than social movement activism and less comprehensive than general
elections and legislation.

The key institutions might be called contextualizing

regimes.
Consider what some call “second generation” race discrimination, or more
generally, civil rights problems. First generation law focused on consciously and
explicitly invidious discrimination or, in related areas such as the Fourth
Amendment, egregiously reckless conduct. By contrast, second generation issues
arise from conduct that is not invidiously motivated or egregiously reckless but is
foreseeably disproportionately harmful to groups or values protected by civil rights
law. Disparate impact discrimination claims are a key example.
A disparate impact claimant challenges a practice, such as a college-degree
requirement for a job, that foreseeably disadvantages a protected group.

The

plaintiff may assert that the requirement was motivated by a desire to achieve this
effect and is thus merely a disguised form of invidious discrimination.

The

defendant responds by adducing non-discriminatory grounds that might justify the
practice. In the employment context, she might say that the requirement correlates
13

with higher productivity. From the plaintiff’s point of view, traditional doctrine is
unsatisfactory because the existence of a possible legitimate ground does not mean
that the decision was not influenced by discriminatory sentiment. Experimental
psychology has taught that racial preconceptions are pervasive but, in the postBrown era, often unconscious and nearly always unacknowledged. However, if
doctrine permits an inference of discrimination from foreseeably disparate impact,
it may put the defendant in an unfair situation. Since it is often impossible to
conclusively demonstrate the productivity effects of an employment requirement,
cases will often be decided by the allocation of the burden of proof. The losing party
often feels that he lost because of unrealistic evidentiary burdens.
An important response to such difficulties emphasizes notions such as “less
restrictive alternative” and “reasonable accommodation”. 17 Under the strong
versions of these requirements, where there are alternative practices that serve the
defendant’s legitimate purposes while doing less harm to protected groups or
values, the defendant should adopt them. Where doctrine remains focused on
intent, the reason to adopt mitigating measures is to escape an inference that the
more burdensome practice was invidiously motivated. But in the more demanding
versions, intent is no longer the touchstone. The duty to assess impact of practices
on protected groups and to search for less burdensome alternatives becomes a core
element of the duty of equal protection.
Second-generation civil rights issues are part of a broader class of issues that
confront the modern state characterized by variation and fluidity. Democratic
experimentalism views these conditions as calling for responses customized to local
contexts or revised more or less continuously as new understanding accrues. In

The “less restrictive alternative” principle, which warrants an inference of discrimination
from the defendant’s failure to adopt a measure that serves its purposes but does less harm, plays a
role in doctrine under Titles VI, and VII of the Civil Rights Act. The “reasonable accommodation”
requirement, which requires affirmative mitigation of conditions that disproportionately burden
protected groups is most salient in the Americans with Disabilities Act. It also plays a role in the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Family Medical Leave Act. See Noah Zatz, “Managing the
Macaw: Third Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent”,
Columbia Law Review, 109 (2009); Susan Sturm, “Second Generation Employment Discrimination”,
Columbia Law Review, 101 (2001); Pamela Perry, “Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination”, 59
Fordham Law Review, 59 (1995).
17
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these situations, neither ends nor means may be fully clear prior to intervention.
Thus, intervention must be provisional, and it must take the form in part of
investigation. In regimes of this kind, a central institution authorizes and oversees
local experimentation within uniform parameters. Local initiatives are transparent
and their effects are routinely assessed. The center holds the local units accountable
to the parameters and aggregates information about local efforts. Local initiatives
are developed through stakeholder deliberations. So initially, general principles are
elaborated locally in varied ways. But there remains the possibility that as some
local initiatives gain recognition, their premises will come to be widely shared and
eventually may be incorporated into the uniform framework.
Local investigation in experimentalist regimes typically involves stakeholder
deliberation. Such deliberation has an instrumental rationale. Stakeholders have
information that officials cannot easily gather without engaging them, and
implementation may require cooperation by stakeholders that engagement may
induce. But there is also a democratic rationale. Stakeholder deliberation is a form
of self-government, one that focuses more concretely than general elections or
legislatures on problems that affect the participating citizens.
Civil rights issues in juvenile detention provide an example.

Pretrial

detention is constitutionally permissible only on the basis of demonstrable risk that
the defendant will fail to appear for trial or will re-offend if left at large. In addition,
detention decisions must be race-neutral. Yet, many studies conclude that decisions
do not correlate with indicators of risk and that they are racially biased. The studies
are usually controversial, however, and it is typically open to defendants to argue
that the data is inadequate or improperly measured or that relevant variables have
been omitted.

Moreover, even if inappropriate detention could be established

through aggregate data, the consequent remedy might be controversial. It would
not be enough to order the defendants to detain only where the risks justified it or
to stop discriminating. It would be necessary to tell them how to do so, and there
would likely be controversy at that stage.
In recent years, federal legislation and foundation initiatives have produced a
distinctive approach to the problem.

Courts have not participated in this
15

development in the pre-emptive manner that the critics worry about. But the
development exemplifies a conception of right that seems to moot the critics’
objections to judicial intervention. As we will see, the courts have intervened in
activist fashion in other areas on the basis of this conception.
With respect to racial disparities, local juvenile justice agencies are obliged
under the emergent regime to measure the racial incidence of decisions that
potentially lead to detention, and when they find disparities, to develop plans for
mitigating them. The Department of Justice and the Annie E. Casey Foundation
provide technical assistance and prescribe metrics for measuring disparities. These
efforts, known as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), have
generated a network of state and local agencies that involves about half of the
relevant agencies in the country. The agencies pool information and engage in
various informal modes of peer review.
JDAI has transformed the process of juvenile detention in the past quarter
century. Detention has fallen dramatically during this period. While aggregate
racial disparities have persisted, they have fallen in some localities, and since
minorities are over-represented in detention, the aggregate reduction has benefited
them disproportionately.18
Two elements of this transformation are especially interesting. One is the
replacement of informal probation officer judgments about pretrial detention with
empirically validated risk assessment instruments.

The instruments dictate a

decision on the basis of scores determined by objective factors such as prior
offenses or the availability of an adult to take responsibility for the child. (The
numerical scores can be over-ridden where the official believes the instrument does
not adequately account for some aspect of the situation but only with supervisor

Detention has fallen in non-JDAI sites as well, but there is some evidence that it has fallen
more in JDAI sites. The comparison is difficult in part because many non-JDAI sites have adopted
reforms emphasized in JDAI. Barry Krisberg, JDAI Sites and States 2011 (Chief Justice Earl Warren
Center Institute on Law and Social Policy 2012). On JDAI in general, see Sabel and Simon, cited in
note, at 21-28; Annie E. Casey Foundation, Two Decades of JDAI: From Demonstration Project to
National Standard (2009). The importance of local stakeholder participation in JDAI is argued in
James Bell et all, The Keeper and the Kept: Reflections on Local Obstacles to Disparities Reduction in
Juvenile Justice Systems and a Path to Change (W. Heywood Burns Foundation 2009).
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approval and subsequent review.)

Agencies are supposed to validate their

instruments on the basis of data from their own and others’ experience. Each
criterion is tested for its power to predict the consequences that justify detention –
re-offense and failure to appear in court.
The other key JDAI practice has to do with the attempt to diagnose the
sources of racial disparity and find ways to mitigate them.

A mundane but

potentially important example concerns notification and transportation initiatives.
Some jurisdictions have achieved major reductions in failures to appear by routinely
telephoning parents prior to a scheduled appearance, reminding them of the date,
and telling them exactly where the child should appear and what to expect.
Sometimes, notification is coupled with an offer of transportation. In Santa Cruz
County, California, Latinos are concentrated around Watsonville in the southern
part of the county, while the courthouse is located in a sparsely developed area of
the north poorly served by public transportation. When the probation department
inaugurated a bus service from Watsonville to the courthouse, failures to appear
dropped significantly.
More complex mitigation strategies involve the development of less
restrictive forms of supervision than incarceration.
technology-based example.

Electronic monitoring is a

Others, such as after-school reporting centers,

mentoring or coaching programs, and substance abuse treatment, involve social
services. The reasonableness of a decision to detain will depend substantially on the
availability of such alternatives. A community that fails to develop them will have
more occasions to incarcerate. Individual decisions may seem reasonable viewed in
isolation, but the community’s failure to develop its institutions may seem
unreasonable when viewed in terms of its aggregate effects on incarceration. (Thus,
do negative rights to liberty shade into positive rights to government services.)
JDAI prescribes an evidence-based approach to reform.

Agencies must

specify metrics for assessing the success of their initiatives and periodically reassess them in the light of experience.
interdisciplinary collaborations.

They must establish inter-agency and

Typically, criminal justice agencies form

collaborations with social service agencies and private service providers.
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And

continuous consultation with community leaders and organizations over both
detention criteria and alternatives is standard.
Viewed as a process of rights elaboration, JDAI has two stages. In the first
stage, responsible officials have a duty to assess the effects of their practices on
relevant civil rights values and to scan for less harmful alternative practices. The
second stage occurs once experimentation produces consensus around specific
interventions. At this point, officials have a duty to adopt proven interventions
unless they can articulate plausible reasons why they would not be effective in their
circumstances.
JDAI illustrates a process of consensus formation over constitutional
elaboration.

The mechanism of the process is slightly different from the one

emphasized in DC. DC most often portrays movement toward agreement arising
from the pressure to provisionally identify with an antagonist’s perspective in order
to respond to her concerns in the context of a commitment to a common
constitution. In DE, progress is more often portrayed as coming from pressure to
dissolve abstract assertions of value or position into more concrete propositions,
the discovery of common ground among these more concrete propositions, and the
subjection some propositions to empirical testing. The course by which vague
general judgments about dangerousness were translated into concrete propositions
and then tested systematically is an example.
Litigation has not played a strong direct role in the JDAI process. Courts have
participated as partners in the administrative coalitions that have designed the
reforms, and they have implemented the reforms in individual case decisions. They
have not, however, mandated them as a matter of equal protection doctrine. The
Department of Justice has primary enforcement responsibility and it has favored
informal pressure over litigation. 19
We do, however, find courts imposing analogous remedies in institutional
reform cases in such areas as schools, policing, prisons, and housing. The process in
Private enforcement is inhibited by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which
refused to recognize a private right of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
forbids discrimination by federal grantees. Other authority that might support judicial challenges
remains, but it may be less hospitable than Title VI to disparate impact claims.
19
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these cases is another example of the complex relation of substance and process,
judicial judgment and extra-judicial deliberation.20
Typically, the plaintiffs will prove a series of individual instances of official
conduct they allege violate civil rights. The child welfare agency maintains children
in foster placements where they are under-nourished. Police officers use deadly
force to stop fleeing unarmed people suspected of nonviolent crimes. A prison
places prisoners in long-term solitary confinement as punishment for disrespect to
guards. The court makes a substantive judgment in each of these instances as to
whether the conduct is permissible under statutes or the Constitution.

The

constitutional and statutory norms overlap and both tend to be stated in terms of
very general substantive values like equality, due process, or cruel and unusual
punishment. These are clearly the kinds of judgments about which the critics are
uneasy.
But these judgments are rarely the controversial part of the cases. Most
often, when the court finds liability in these individual cases, its judgments are
supported by broadly shared popular sentiment or by professional standards that
the defendants often concede are applicable. Controversy arises at one or all of the
next stages. In the immediate next stage, the court determines whether these
incidents, in combination with evidence of general administrative practice and
structure, indicate that violations are systemic and warrant structural relief. In the
next stage, the court enters a remedial order. And then finally, the court determines
when there has been sufficient compliance with the order to terminate the
intervention.
Once a systemic violation is found, the case starts to play out in a manner
that strongly resembles the JDAI process. The court orders the defendants to
negotiate a remedial regime with the plaintiffs.
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See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
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William H. Simon, “Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child
Welfare Reform”, Law & Social Inquiry, 34 (2009); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, “The Duty
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defendants prove willing to do so without much coercion, but where necessary, the
court will push with a threat of some harsh default remedy such as contempt
sanctions or the closing of a program or facility. The parties then typically produce
a decree that the court confirms.
When the decrees contain substantive provisions, such as limits on cell size
or requirements that children in foster care get medical examinations, the
provisions are often based on standards from professional organizations. Then the
decrees will provide for extensive monitoring and reporting. And further, they
provide for re-assessment of practices in the light of the experience shown in the
monitoring.
Two sorts of controversy are common. The defendants and their supporters
often object to structural relief on the ground that it would interfere with
democratic processes. And they often object to particular remedial provisions on
the ground that they are not entailed by the substantive violations the court has
found. For example, they might object to a requirement that police carry body
cameras on the ground that there are many ways to monitor misconduct and the
court’s findings of substantive violations do not require this particular remedy.
These objections resemble the points that the critique makes against preemptive
judicial review. While structural injunctions limit executive rather than legislative
power, they too involve the constraint of elected officials by democratically
unaccountable judges.
The way rights get elaborated in JDAI and institutional reform litigation has
resemblances to Democratic Constitutionalism, and the responses in Democratic
Constitutionalism to concerns about democracy overlap those in Democratic
Experimentalism.
To begin with, as in DC, the Experimentalist interventions involve a vision of
democracy reinforcement that goes beyond Ely’s electoral view. As DC emphasizes
the importance of social movements, DE emphasizes the importance of stakeholder
participation. Statutes like Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which
underpins the JDAI, encourage local agencies to engage stakeholders in devising
solutions to specified problems.

Structural injunctions pressure defendants to
20

engage with the plaintiffs and other stakeholders and frequently mandate
participatory processes explicitly.
In litigation, the rationale for the court’s mandate is that the substantive
violations found in the liability determination demonstrate a failure to take account
of interests of stakeholder constituencies and consequently a defect in the
democratic process. Substantive violations are treated as symptoms of democratic
failings.21
In addition, as in Democratic Constitutionalism, intervention is often
supported by an emerging consensus and has the effect of codifying or consolidating
it. Many institutional reform decrees force outlier institutions to adopt practices
widely viewed elsewhere as standard. For example, some of the early prison cases
dealt with prisons that still employed the system by which guards delegated
disciplinary authority to inmate “trusties”.

The system had been abandoned

throughout most of the country and was widely condemned within the corrections
profession. A series of decrees prohibiting it in recalcitrant institutions basically
codified this view.22 In juvenile justice, the practice of validated risk assessment
instruments and detention alternatives such as electronic monitoring seem to be
emerging as consensus norms. Were a plaintiff to show repeated instances of
substantive violations by an agency that lacked such practices, a court would have a
substantial basis on which to order them.
Next, structural intervention has deliberation-inducing tendencies analogous
to those portrayed in DC. At their most pre-emptive, the courts impose substantive
rulings directly. They may rule that a certain level of prison crowding or the
punitive imposition of solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment, for
example. Here the court puts the weight of its authority most strongly behind
propositions of substantive justice. But again, such propositions are subject to
political contestation. The court’s rulings can become a subject of debate in civil
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society and the electoral process, and the other branches can respond either
supportively or in opposition.

Prison decrees, in particular, have engendered

extensively controversy and legislative response. In consequence, the courts have
increased the burdens on plaintiffs to establish liability and have tailored decrees
more narrowly. But a set of core principles and interventions seems to have been
established.23
However, a striking characteristic of structural interventions is their
tendency to refrain from specifying substantive duties categorically and instead to
mandate directly that officials engage with stakeholders. Defendants are induced to
negotiate with plaintiffs both over the terms of the decree and throughout its life
over issues of compliance. Judicial decrees typically mandate various types of
deliberative engagement directly. For example, the recent federal decree against
the New York City police department requires the department to hold a series of
community forums to explain the decree and seek suggestions for its
implementations.

Police decrees typically contain provisions prescribing the

operation of civilian complaint bodies and, sometimes, of more proactive citizen
oversight processes.

The Department of Justice, which has negotiated consent

decrees with police departments throughout the country, has played a role in
facilitating the exchange of information and developing standards across
jurisdictions.
Judicial practice in this regard takes a form similar to what Congress
mandated by statute in the juvenile justice area.

The Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention Act encourages deliberation in various ways. Agencies
have incentives to exchange information to demonstrate the seriousness of their
efforts to the Department of Justice. State and local agencies have formed the
Coalition for Juvenile Justice to facilitate collaborative support, and the Casey
Foundation brings agencies together routinely. DOJ pressures laggards to get peer
assistance from other agencies.

Another dimension of deliberation involves

agencies and local civic leaders and NGOs. The design of detention alternatives
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typically benefits from consultation with stakeholders, and some programs are most
appropriately administered by local NGOs.
The type of coercion involved here is predominantly agenda-setting and
decision-forcing. Officials are forced to address issues to an extent greater than they
would prefer. They are required to act more explicitly and transparently than they
would prefer. And they are induced to address stakeholders they would prefer to
ignore. When these interventions come from courts, they are not democratic in the
sense that the critics mean, and when they are mandated by Congress, they override
local democracy in a way that many object to on grounds analogous to those of the
critique.24 But if they are not democratic in origin, they are democracy-reinforcing
in effect. In making practice more explicit and transparent, they facilitate oversight
in the legislative and electoral process. At the same time, they introduce a less
episodic and more concentrated type of accountability to stakeholders.
Such interventions could be defended on the ground that they typically are
designed to protect people, such as minorities, prisoners, mental health patients, or
children in dysfunctional families, who seem especially vulnerable in majoritarian
political processes. Note, however, that judicial practice in institutional reform
cases is responsive to concerns that democracy-reinforcement arguments tend to
underestimate the capacities of electoral institutions or to too readily translate
substantive claims into procedural defects. For judicial intervention only occurs
when its proponents have demonstrated a systemic failure on the part of the
defendant to fulfill its responsibilities.
Finally, structural intervention has a dimension analogous to the shifting of
the burden of initiative in judicial review. With conventional judicial review, the
court’s invalidation of a statute forces proponents to resort to the political process
to seek to re-establish their position.

This effect may also occur with structural

decrees. However, there is also a shifting of burdens that occurs within the lawsuit.
We’ve noted that the court tries to avoid imposing relief directly and instead
induces the parties to negotiate.

This is because the parties have superior
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information and expertise. The court’s goal is to induce them to deal with each
other productively, and in particular, to get the defendant to engage with the
plaintiffs. Intervention is thus substantially indirect. It can involve a penalty for
failure to undertake open-ended deliberative effort or a reward for doing so. In
JDAI, the federal government threatens to withdraw funding for other criminal
justice efforts when efforts to mitigate racial disparities are inadequate and both the
government and the Casey Foundation provide grants for such efforts. In structural
litigation, the court threatens a penalty that neither party desires, such as closing a
facility or holding officers in contempt, in order to induce the parties to negotiate a
better one.
IV. Activism and Accountability
The argument of the critics is that judicial interventions based on
controversial judgments about substantive justice are illegitimate because they are
incompatible with democracy. DC and DE challenge each of the three key premises
of the argument – interventions, legitimacy, democracy.
Intervention.

The intervention that most engages the critics is judicial

review, which they understand in pre-emptive terms.

In fact, even the most

aggressive forms of judicial review are not pre-emptive in any categorical long-term
sense. Any case can eventually be reversed by a new corps of judges, and even in
the short term, the practical import of a case will depend substantially on the
actions of the other branches, social movements, and stakeholders.
If cases are not literally pre-emptive, they nevertheless may have political
effects.

Two sorts of interventions can be defended in terms of the values of

consensus and democracy that the critics invoke.

A case, such as Gideon v.

Wainwright may consolidate an emerging consensus by imposing it on lagging
outliers.

Or a case like Reynolds v. Sims25 (imposing the one-person/one-vote

requirement for state legislative districting) may mandate a constitutive condition
of democracy. Not all the critics would agree that courts are better positioned to
identify and vindicate consensus or democracy than legislatures. But the argument
25
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would seem to require a practical analysis of actual judicial practice. It is not
resolved by the categorical appeals to consensus and democracy of the critique.
Other types of intervention have political effects that cannot be characterized
as vindicating consensus or democratic process values.

Two such effects are

important here. A case may elevate an issue on the public agenda and force explicit
decisions by officials who would prefer to ignore such matters or deal with them out
of public view. And a case may reverse the burden of initiative, depriving the
beneficiaries of the status quo of the privilege of passive enjoyment.
Now, on one definition of democracy, a definition that some critics may
accept, these effects are not especially troubling. On this definition, democracy is
not threatened by a judicial decision as long as it can be reversed by a current
legislative majority. It is the assumed legislative irreversibility of a decision that
most riles the critics. But it is not clear why they would exempt decisions that
merely focus attention, or force decisions, or reallocate the burden of inertia. These
are real political effects that confer tangible advantages. Moreover, the courts’
exercise of power with respect to these effects is not defensible in the majoritarian
electoral terms that define democracy to the critics. However, some such effects are
inevitable in any system of adjudication where legal authority is incomplete or
indeterminate and judicial decisions have general (for example, precedential)
effects.
Democracy.

An important line of criticism would question whether the thin

conception of democracy assumed by the critics should trump powerful substantive
claims of injustice. However, I put this point aside in order to focus on the key
normative underpinning of the critics’ appeal to democracy. They value democracy
because it treats people equally, or at least does so more than alternative modes of
decision-making.26 But there are many kinds of equality. The equality the critics
exalt is the arithmetic kind associated with voting in general elections – one
person/one vote. Arithmetic equality is inapposite in many contexts. It might be
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seriously inappropriate to give arithmetically equivalent medical benefits to the sick
and the healthy or to tax the poor and the wealthy the same amount.
In democracy, the objection to arithmetic equality is that it does not respond
to the “problem of intensity”, that is, to variations in knowledge and interest. 27 One
person/one vote treats people the same without regard to the intensity of their
interest in or knowledge about the issues. It gives the same weight to the votes of
those who will not be affected at all by a decision as to those whose happiness
depends on it. It makes no distinction between those who are barely aware of the
issue and those who have studied and thought about it. (Moreover, it denies any say
to people outside the jurisdiction, no matter how much they know or care about the
matter.) The advantage of one-person/one-vote is that it obviates definition and
measurement of intensity. But the advantage comes at the cost of ignoring intensity.
The problem of intensity is a more general version of the problem of majority
insensitivity to minority interests emphasized by Ely and many others. Recognizing
the generality of the problem has two effects. It suggests, first, that we cannot solve
it by carving out a special set of decisions where courts can be authorized to trump
legislative judgments. It also suggests that a plausible set of democratic institutions
might combine electoral and legislative processes with others reflecting a different
notion of equality.
In contrast to the majoritarian electoral processes emphasized by the critics,
DC and DE emphasize democratic processes that are not built on arithmetic
equality. Both the processes of civil society opinion formation emphasized by DC
and the processes of stakeholder deliberation emphasized in DE aspire to take
account of intensity of interest and knowledge. Social movements tend to allocate
influence in proportion to effort and informally perceived efficacy, which have some
correlation with interest and knowledge. Stakeholder groups tend to be constituted
through either or both administrative selection, which typically purports to focus on
interest and knowledge, or self-selection, which has some correlation with them.
Once constituted, they often aspire to decide by consensus and frequently require at
27

See Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, New Haven CN: Yale University Press

(1956).

26

least a super-majority for decision.

There is no guarantee that either social

movement processes or stakeholder ones will correlate influence with interest and
knowledge, but when they succeed, they vindicate an aspect of the democratic ideal
that conventional electoral-legislative processes do not.28
Legitimacy.

All the perspectives we are considering start out with the

corrosive insights of critical modernism: The authority of history, text, and abstract
reason is ambiguous. In such a world, public decisions need to be grounded, at least
substantially, in democratic process or consensus. But DC and DE develop the idea
of consensus differently from the critique in two key respects.
First, they refuse to take the institutional circumstances of consensus
formation for granted, and they accord the courts a role in enforcing the
preconditions of democratic consensus formation that may put them in tension with
the electoral branches. This puts at the center of the idea of judicial democracyreinforcement, as elaborated by Ely and others, not only the electoral
representation-protecting interventions, but also deliberation-reinforcing decisions
that protect social movements and the public forum. It also brings to the fore the
dimension of institutional reform decrees that compel agencies whose failures to
respect the interests of stakeholders have been established, to engage those
stakeholders in ways that hold out the possibility of producing local consensus that
will guide reform.
Second, while for the critics, a legitimating consensus must pre-exist the
decision, DC and DE both suggest that legitimation can come from potential
consensus.

The suggestion seems most daring with respect to the counter-

majoritarian decisions that most concern the critics. Here the court intervenes with
on the basis of a substantive judgment about justice that does not have consensus
support. The decision does not pre-empt conclusively. It provides a focus and
reason for public deliberation. It is, however, an exercise of power that biases the
political process in favor of the proposition.
28

So the legitimacy of the distinctive
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judicial practice defended by DC and DE requires a further ground. Such a ground
might be found in, if it occurs, the eventual acceptance of the decision across the
political spectrum.
At first glance, the idea of ratification might seem a helpful analogy, but in
fact, it is misleading. At common law, when an agent exceeds her authority, the
principal can make her actions effectuve by approving her initiative post hoc.
However, the analogy is inapposite to the extent that in the conventional principalagent model, the principal knows what she wants when she sees it. The ratification
option

reflects

the

principal’s

comprehensively ex ante.

limited

ability

to

formulate

instructions

By contrast, in Democratic Constitutionalism and

Democratic Experimentalism, the Principal (the People) is divided and ambivalent.
The court’s initiative leads, not to an immediate binary decision of approval or
disapproval, but to a prolonged process of deliberation and contestation. And if
approval comes, the Principal may have been transformed by the process induced
by the agent’s (court’s) initiative.
Moreover, in the conventional agency model, the agent’s job is to advance the
Principal’s goals. The judge’s job, however, is not simply to assess or even to
anticipate the views of the People. The judge is not a pollster. No doubt popular
views enter into the judge’s decision-making. The prevalence of a social norm or
convention may be an explicit ground of decision when relevant norms like
reasonableness or “cruel and unusual” punishment refer to it. In addition, everyone
expects that judges will make tacit assessment of the likely popular and political
reaction to their decisions. But the deliberation-inducing role of judicial judgments
depends in part on the premise that judgments at least in part reflect the courts
considered views about the merits of the case. Both Democratic Constitutionalism
and Democratic Experimentalism understand that in hard cases, where positive
authority is ambiguous or incomplete, judges will ground decisions in judgments
about substantive justice.

These decisions may have authority because of

institutional features of the courts role – independence, disinterestedness, and
reason-giving. But these qualities would seem relevant only to the extent the judge
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decides on the merits. They do not suggest that the judge would be particularly
adept at assessing the state of popular opinion.
The legitimacy of the power associated with such judgments does not rest
directly on democracy or consensus. But both DC and DE suggest that it rests on the
potential contribution of such judgments to the processes of democratic decisionmaking and consensus formation. So part of the legitimacy of decisions like Brown
and the gender suspect classification cases comes after the fact. At the moment of
decision, legitimacy is partial and contingent. It depends on the plausibility of its
procedural and substantive premises. But since at this point, the decisions are not
adequately grounded in democracy (procedurally understood) or consensus,
legitimacy requires more. Some of the gap may be filled by the fact that the decision
is open to disapproval and, eventually, rejection by coordinate institutions, the
electorate, and civil society. But fully grounded legitimacy depends on acceptance.29
So legitimacy is contingent and forward-looking at the time of decision and
retrospective at the time consensus arises.

This is a more qualified form of

legitimacy than the critics want. But it may be the only kind that is consistent with
Brown and other foundational cases.
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